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 ABSTRACT 
 
There is disagreement amongst economists regarding whether economics students are 
more self-interested than other students in economic and non-economic contexts. 
Econometric analysis of the choice to share in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game suggests 
that it may not be economics students per se that have a lower probability of choosing 
share rather than compete, but instead that individuals with attitudes, motivations and 
values similar to those assumed by standard economic theory have a lower probability 
of choosing share. The experimental evidence here of 1,701 students suggests that it is 
the motivations and attitudes of subjects that are important for determining economic 
choices rather than simply whether the individual studies economics. The results 
confirm that a higher proportion of economics students have motivations in a game 
theory context that are similar to those assumed by standard economic theory, yet that 
their related general attitudes and values are not significantly different. Overall the 
results suggest that the assumptions of standard economic theory are appropriate for a 
subset of individuals, and for many individuals who do not study economics. 
 
Key words: Individual decision making, experimental economics, prisoner’s dilemma 
games, economists versus non-economists, student attitudes and motivations 
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1. Introduction 
Economists disagree about whether economics students are more self-interested than 
other students. Some studies address whether economics students are more self-
interested in an economic context, generally finding that economics students are more 
self-interested in an economic context. Other studies address whether economics 
students are more self-interested in a more general context, generally finding that they 
are not more self-interested in a general context, although the evidence is somewhat 
mixed.1 This study finds empirical support for both of these seemingly contradictory 
findings. We analyse whether economics students are more self-interested in an 
economic and a more general context using data on decisions in an economic context, 
the motivations for those decisions and general attitudes and values. This study is 
different to other studies as decisions are not only observed but subjects also state 
why they made their decisions and their general attitudes in a non-economic context. 
Furthermore the same students are analysed regarding whether they are more self-
interested both in an economic and a more general context. 
 
2. Previous Studies 
The results of the studies of Marwell and Ames (1981), Frank et al. (1993) and Carter 
and Irons (1991) suggest that economics students act according to economic theory in 
an economic context. Marwell and Ames (1981) found that economics students were 
more likely to free ride than other students regarding contributions towards a public 
good. Frank et al. (1993) found that economics students were significantly more likely 
to defect in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game than non-economics students. Carter and 
Irons (1991) found that in an ultimatum bargaining game economics students act more 
accordingly than other students to economic theory in an economic context, as when 
dividing a sum of money between themselves and another player in comparison to 
other students, economics students propose higher amounts of money for themselves 
yet accept lower amounts of money when proposed by the other player. However, 
Stanley and Tran (1998) found the reverse, and suggest that economics students can 
be more altruistic than other students. Although the sample size is small, the findings 
of Stanley and Tran (1998) suggest the possibility that economics students may not 
always act more accordingly than other students to economic theory in an economic 
context, and that for some economics students issues such as altruism and fairness 
may be important. 
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The evidence is somewhat mixed regarding whether economics students are more 
self-interested in a more general context. The results of the studies of Yezer et al. 
(1996) suggest that economics students are less likely than other students to act 
according to economic theory in a general non-economic context, however Laband 
and Beil (1999) suggest that economics students are no more likely than other 
students to act according to economic theory in a general non-economic context, and 
Frey and Meier (2003, 2005) and Frank and Schulze (2000) suggest that economics 
students are more likely than other students to act according to economic theory in a 
general non-economic context. Yezer et al. (1996) found that in a lost letter 
experiment economics students were more cooperative than non-economics students. 
Laband and Beil (1999) found that professional economists are no less cooperative 
than non-economists regarding cheating on their Association dues.  Frey and Meier 
(2003, 2005) found that economics students donate less money to a pure public good 
in a real-life context, but that this is due to a selection effect rather than indoctrination 
and hence economics education does not cause economics students to act according to 
economic theory, the difference already exists. Frey et al. (1993) found that 
economics students believe the price system is more fair than the general population, 
but that this is due to a selection effect rather than indoctrination. Frank and Schulze 
(2000) found that economics students are more corrupt that non-economics students 
using a bribery experiment, but that this is due to self-selection rather than 
indoctrination. 
 
Many of the above studies find that the differences observed between economics and 
non-economics students is due to self-selection rather than indoctrination. Therefore 
the focus of this study differs from previous studies as it does not examine whether 
economics students are different due to self-selection or indoctrination, but seeks to 
instead examine these differences in order to determine whether they can be explained 
in terms of motivations and attitudes and to examine the impact of these in the context 
of economic decision-making and a more general context.   
 
3. Experimental Design 
A Prisoner’s Dilemma game was conducted at the University of Sheffield, UK to 
analyse motivations and the underlying attitudes and values that are present in 
individual economic decision-making. An online questionnaire was used due to its 
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many advantages: low costs, short time-span, quick and accurate data collection, 
relatively large sample size and reduction of experimenter bias.2 All undergraduate 
and postgraduate students at the University of Sheffield received an email requesting 
them to complete the questionnaire and hence all participants were volunteers and 
were not pre-selected.3 The sample of 1,701 students is 7.27% of the total population 
which is a relatively high response rate.4 Of the 1,701 students, 63% are female, 79% 
are undergraduate students, 51% are aged under 21 and 5% (83 single honours and 9 
dual honours subjects) are economics students. The sample is largely representative of 
the University of Sheffield student population where 55% are female, 79% are 
undergraduate and 70% are aged under 21. 
 
The focus of the online questionnaire was upon determining the motivations behind 
decisions in a game theory context by asking subjects directly what motivated their 
decisions in six modifications of a Prisoner’s Dilemma game with the strategies 
‘share’ or ‘compete’, and furthermore determining their overall self-interested and 
ethical beliefs.5 Subjects made their decisions in all six games before they were 
questioned about what motivated their decisions. Subjects were asked to tick from a 
list all motivations they considered or used to make their decisions and were then 
questioned about their underlying attitudes and values. The Prisoner’s Dilemma game 
analysed here is shown in figure 1 below where ‘you’ refers to the subject.6 As 
illustrated in figure 1 below, the payoff for mutual competition is £50, the payoff for 
competing when the other player shares is £100, the payoff for mutual sharing is £75 
and the payoff for sharing when then other player competes is £25. A large proportion 
(67%) of the sample chose compete but a significant number of subjects did not 
choose compete and this is in accordance with much of the literature regarding the 
standard Prisoner’s Dilemma game. A statistically significant larger proportion (80%) 
of all economics students in the sample chose compete, and hence their observed 
actions in a game theory context are more self-interested and this is in accordance 
with Carter and Irons (1991), Frank. et al (1993) and Marwell and Ames (1981). 
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Player 2
You
Share
Compete
Share
Compete
£75, £75 £25, £100
£100, £25 £50, £50
 
Figure 1 Standard Prisoner’s Dilemma game 
 
4. Analysis and Results 
Table 1 lists the four motivation questions that capture standard economic theory as a 
motivating factor for the choices in the six Prisoner’s Dilemma games. These 
responses demonstrate that not wanting to have a low payoff, wanting to have a high 
payoff and wanting to have the highest payoff possible are motivating factors for a 
large proportion of subjects. Only 55% of subjects were motivated by having the 
highest payoff possible every time, which is lower than may be expected from 
standard economic theory. A large proportion of subjects never used the potential 
amounts of money received to anticipate the choice of player 2. These results overall 
suggest that standard economic theory captures the motivations of a large proportion 
of subjects, but also a significant proportion of subjects do not act according to 
economic theory.7  
 
The motivations capturing the assumptions of standard economic theory are generally 
motivating factors for a statistically significant higher proportion of males, 
undergraduate students and younger age groups. The motivations capturing the 
assumptions of standard economic theory are generally motivating factors for a 
statistically significant higher proportion of economics students, thus suggesting that 
economics students largely have motivations in a game theory context that are in 
accordance with economic theory and this includes first year students who have not 
yet studied game theory. This is largely in accordance with the literature (Carter and 
Irons (1991); Frank et al. (1993); Marwell and Ames (1981)). 
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Table 1 Responses for standard economic theory as a motivating factor for 
responses in six Prisoner’s Dilemma games 
 
Motivation question Response All subjects, 
% 
Economics 
students, % 
Non economics 
students, % 
Every time 72.17 84.78 71.45 
Sometimes 19.83 10.87 20.35 
Q1 Not wanting to have a 
low payoff* 
Never 7.99 4.35 8.20 
Every time 67.91 81.52 67.13 
Sometimes 26.89 16.30 27.50 
Q2 Wanting to have a high 
payoff* 
Never 5.20 2.17 5.38 
Every time 54.99 59.78 54.71 
Sometimes 33.98 34.78 33.94 
Q3 Wanting to have the 
highest payoff possible 
Never 11.03 5.43 11.35 
Every time 28.61 40.22 27.94 
Sometimes 41.96 43.48 41.88 
Q4 Using the potential 
amounts of money received 
to anticipate the choice of 
player 2* Never 29.43 16.30 30.19 
* Using the chi-squared p-value to determine statistical significance, motivations are not independent 
of and hence are affected by whether the subject is an economics student. 
 
Table 2 summarises the responses for general attitudes and values regarding those 
assumed by standard economic theory in a game theory context. Ninety four percent 
of subjects agree with the statement ‘I consider how my actions affect others’ and 
93% of subjects agree with the statement ‘I am concerned about how my actions 
affect others’. Thirty four percent and 41% of subjects agree and disagree respectively 
with the statement ‘I always choose to do what benefits me most’ and 13% and 73% 
of subjects agree and disagree respectively with the statement ‘I choose to do what 
benefits me regardless of how it affects others’. These responses indicate that the 
majority of subjects do consider and are concerned by how their actions affect others. 
Although some subjects will choose actions to benefit themselves at the expense of 
others, a large proportion of subjects will not do this. Therefore this suggests that one 
important factor in the decision-making process is considering others as well as 
oneself. 
 
Generally males demonstrate stronger general attitudes and values regarding those 
assumed by standard economic theory in a game theory context, whereas arts students 
and dual faculty students demonstrate weaker attitudes and values. The results for 
motivations and attitudes regarding standard economic theory is consistent for males. 
Attitudes regarding standard economic theory are independent of and hence are not 
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affected by whether the subject studies economics for 3 out of the 4 statements. This 
suggests that although a significantly higher proportion of economics students choose 
compete rather than share and have motivations that capture the assumptions of 
standard economic theory in the six Prisoner’s Dilemma games, studying economics 
does not necessarily mean that students adopt general attitudes and values similar to 
those assumed by standard economic theory. This is generally consistent with the 
literature as discussed above as it suggests that economics students are more self-
interested in a game theory context, but that this does not imply that they are more 
self-interested in a non-economic context. Overall the results suggest that standard 
economic theory captures the motivations of a large proportion of subjects, but also a 
significant proportion of subjects do not act according to and do not have attitudes 
that are accurately captured by standard economic theory. 
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Table 2 Responses for attitudinal questions regarding standard economic theory 
 
Attitudinal question Response All 
subjects, 
% 
Economics 
students,  % 
Non-
economics 
students, % 
Disagree strongly 0.30 0.00 0.31 
Disagree slightly 1.07 1.10 1.06 
Neither agree nor disagree 4.20 9.89 3.88 
Agree slightly 45.92 56.04 45.34 
Q1 I consider how my 
actions affect others 
Agree strongly 48.52 32.97 49.41 
Disagree strongly 0.35 0.00 0.37 
Disagree slightly 1.42 3.30 1.31 
Neither agree nor disagree 5.14 5.49 5.12 
Agree slightly 39.72 48.35 39.23 
Q2 I am concerned about 
how my actions affect 
others 
Agree strongly 53.37 42.86 53.97 
Disagree strongly 11.33 5.49 11.67 
Disagree slightly 29.99 29.67 30.01 
Neither agree nor disagree 24.85 21.98 25.02 
Agree slightly 29.22 36.26 28.82 
Q3 I always choose to do 
what benefits me most* 
Agree strongly 4.60 6.59 4.49 
Disagree strongly 32.33 20.88 32.98 
Disagree slightly 40.25 42.86 40.10 
Neither agree nor disagree 14.54 17.58 14.37 
Agree slightly 11.82 17.58 11.49 
Q4 I choose to do what 
benefits me regardless of 
how it affects others 
Agree strongly 1.06 1.10 1.06 
* Using the chi-squared p-value to determine statistical significance, motivations are not independent 
of and hence are affected by whether the subject is an economics student. 
 
Table 3 presents the results of a probit analysis. The binary dependent variable is 
takes the value 1 if the individual chose ‘share’ and 0 for ‘compete’.8 The probability 
of choosing share depends upon personal characteristics such as sex, age and so forth, 
and arguably upon personal motivations and attitudes. For each game different 
regressions are estimated to determine the probability of choosing share as a function 
of personal characteristics as demonstrated in equation (1) below, as a function of 
personal characteristics and motivations as demonstrated in equation (2) below and as 
a function of personal characteristics, motivations and attitudes as demonstrated in 
equation (3) below. S is the choice to share or compete, C is a vector of personal 
characteristics, M is a vector of motivations and A is a dummy variable or index 
representing attitudes. 
 
 
( )CSS =       (1) 
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( )MC,SS =     (2) 
( )ASS M,C,=      (3) 
  
The models as specified in equations (1) to (3) above can be expressed respectively as 
standard univariate probit models of the choice to share (Greene, 1998, 2000; 
Alexandre and French, 2004): 
 
( )Cβ1Φ== )1Pr(S      (4) 
( )MβCβ 21 +Φ== )1Pr(S     (5) 
( )AβS 3++Φ== MβCβ 21)1Pr(    (6) 
 
where Pr represents probability, the iβ ’s are parameters to estimate and the function 
 is the distribution function of the standard normal distribution. Equations (4) and 
(5) are estimated in models [1] and [2] in table 3 below and equation (6) is estimated 
in models [3] and [4] below where model [3] measures attitudes using an index and 
model [4] measures attitudes using a dummy variable.
( ).Φ
9 Several regressions for each 
game are reported to indicate robustness of the models and to illustrate that the use of 
variables representing motivations and attitudes provides better specified models. 
Separate regressions are estimated using attitude indices and attitude dummy variables 
as these variables should not be used together and these regressions indicate that the 
use of either measure produces similar results. 
 
In all models for game 1 females have a higher probability of sharing, in accordance 
with the results of Frank, Gilovich and Regan (1993), Hu and Liu (2003) and 
Ortmann and Tichy (1999).10 The female dummy variable loses significance in 
models [2], [3] and [4] when motivations and attitudes are used alongside personal 
characteristics variables. This suggests that some differences in observed decision-
making that are usually attributed to sex may be better explained using motivations 
and attitudes rather than sex. In all models for game 1 older students have a higher 
probability of sharing whereas non-white students have a lower probability of sharing. 
Expenditure categories affect the probability of sharing but the relationship is not 
straightforward. In comparison to students in the faculty of arts (reference group), 
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students from all other faculties, and from the economics department have a lower 
probability of sharing.11 Models [2], [3] and [4] are better specified than model [1] as 
indicated by the goodness of fit statistics (pseudo R-squared, likelihood ratio and log 
likelihood) in table 3, and hence the use of motivations and attitudes alongside 
personal characteristics improves the model. 
 
Model [2] includes motivations in addition to personal characteristics in the 
specification of the model, and models [3] and [4] also include attitude variables. 
These motivation and attitude dummy variables are individually analysed and added 
one by one into model [1] and the results for the variables of interest are presented in 
table A1 in the appendix indicating that the signs of these variables are robust. 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient for the motivation and attitude variables are 
presented in table A2 in the appendix. The correlation coefficients indicate that these 
variables do not suffer from multicollinearity and hence the use of these motivation 
and attitude dummy variables together is acceptable.12
 
If the subject responded that they ‘used the potential amounts of money received to 
anticipate the choice of player 2’ every time or sometimes this reduces the probability 
of sharing by 7% and 5% respectively in model [2] using the marginal effects in table 
3. This therefore suggests that the probability of sharing is reduced if individuals 
anticipate the choice of the other player, and hence this is in accordance with standard 
economic theory. If the subject responded that they ‘did not want to have a low 
payoff’ every time this reduces the probability of sharing by 22% in model [2] using 
the marginal effects. If the subject responded that they ‘wanted to have the highest 
payoff possible’ every time or sometimes this reduces the probability of sharing by 
35% and 14% respectively in model [2] using the marginal effects. This suggests that 
the probability of sharing is reduced if the individual does not want to have a low 
payoff and wants to have the highest payoff possible, and hence this is in accordance 
with standard economic theory. 
 
In model [3] the attitude index reduces the probability of sharing and in model [4] the 
attitude dummy variable reduces the probability of sharing, thus suggesting that if 
individuals have attitudes in accordance with the assumptions of standard economic 
theory they have a lower probability of sharing. The attitude index performs better 
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than the attitude dummy variable. The dummy variable representing economics 
students is significant in models [1], [2] and [4] but loses significance when 
motivation variables are included in the specification of the model.13 The results in 
table 3 are in accordance with the discussion above, suggesting that economics 
students have a lower probability of choosing share. The results also indicate that 
subjects with motivations, attitudes and values similar to those assumed by standard 
economic theory have a lower probability of choosing share and these are important 
variables in the estimated models. This suggests that it may not be economics students 
per se that have a lower probability of choosing share, but instead that individuals 
with attitudes, motivations and values similar to those assumed by standard economic 
theory have a lower probability of choosing share, and the economics department has 
a higher proportion of subjects with these motivations.  
 
Table 3 Probit models for the choice to share 
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[1] [2] [3] [4]
 
 
 
Coefficient 
(Z-value) 
Marginal 
effect  
(Z-value) 
Coefficient 
(Z-value) 
Marginal 
effect  
(Z-value) 
Coefficient 
(Z-value) 
Marginal 
effect  
(Z-value) 
Coefficient 
(Z-value) 
Marginal 
effect  
(Z-value) 
Control variables         
Gender (female = 1) 0.173 0.061 0.132 0.046 0.121 0.041 0.133 0.046 
    (2.39)** (1.69)***(2.39)** (1.51)(1.69)*** (1.51) (1.68)*** (1.68)***
Faculty of Architecture -0.412    -0.131 -0.393 -0.122 -0.389 -0.119 -0.397 -0.122 
    (1.86)*** (1.69)***(1.86)*** (1.61)(1.69)*** (1.61) (1.66)*** (1.66)***
Faculty of Engineering -0.298 -0.100 -0.314 -0.102 -0.279  -0.090 -0.297 -0.096 
    (2.13)** (2.11)**(2.13)** (1.82)***(2.11)** (1.82)*** (1.95)*** (1.95)***
Faculty of Law -0.103 -0.036 -0.102 -0.035 -0.062 -0.021 -0.081 -0.028 
 (0.71)        (0.71) (0.66) (0.66) (0.39) (0.39) (0.52) (0.52)
Faculty of Medicine -0.107 -0.038 -0.134      -0.045 -0.141 -0.047 -0.131 -0.044
 (0.75)        (0.75) (0.87) (0.87) (0.90) (0.90) (0.84) (0.84)
Faculty of Pure Science -0.440 -0.147 -0.475      -0.153 -0.458 -0.146 -0.453 -0.146
 (3.88)*        (3.88)* (3.93)* (3.93)* (3.71)* (3.71)* (3.70)* (3.70)*
Faculty of Social Science excluding economics students -0.044 -0.016 -0.043 -0.015     -0.002 -0.001 -0.020 -0.007
 (0.36)        (0.36) (0.33) (0.33) (0.02) (0.02) (0.15) (0.15)
Dual faculty subjects 0.057 0.020 -0.023 -0.008     -0.032 -0.011 -0.018 -0.006
 (0.48)        (0.48) (0.18) (0.18) (0.25) (0.25) (0.14) (0.14)
Economics student -0.459 -0.145 -0.367 -0.116     -0.298 -0.095 -0.360 -0.113
      (2.65)* (2.65)* (2.02)** (1.61)(2.02)** (1.95)***(1.61)  (1.95)***
Age 21-24      0.174 0.063 0.202 0.071 0.201 0.070 0.203 0.071 
 (2.36)**        (2.36)** (2.56)** (2.56)** (2.50)** (2.50)** (2.54)** (2.54)**
Age 25-39    0.218 0.081 0.118 0.042 0.110 0.039 0.148 0.053 
 (1.93)*** (1.93)*** (0.96)      (0.96) (0.87) (0.87) (1.19) (1.19)
Aged over 40       0.895 0.345 0.737 0.284 0.756 0.290 0.750 0.288
 (3.74)*        (3.74)* (2.79)* (2.79)* (2.81)* (2.81)* (2.84)* (2.84)*
Monthly term-time expenditure £200 -399 -0.147 -0.052       -0.100 -0.035 -0.087 -0.030 -0.112 -0.039
 (1.73)*** (1.73)*** (1.10)      (1.10) (0.94) (0.94) (1.22) (1.22)
Monthly term-time expenditure £400-599 -0.017 -0.006 0.018 0.006 0.022 0.008 0.029 0.010 
 (0.16)        (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.20) (0.20) (0.26) (0.26)
Monthly term-time expenditure £600-799 -0.400 -0.129       -0.382 -0.120 -0.363 -0.113 -0.378 -0.118
 (2.37)**        (2.37)** (2.12)** (2.12)** (1.98)** (1.98)** (2.08)** (2.08)**
Monthly term-time expenditure £800-999 -0.125 -0.043     -0.073 -0.025 0.002 0.001 -0.041 -0.014
 (0.57)        (0.57) (0.32) (0.32) (0.01) (0.01) (0.17) (0.17)
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 [1]    [2] [3] [4]
 
 
 
Coefficient 
(Z-value) 
Marginal 
effect  
(Z-value) 
Coefficient 
(Z-value) 
Marginal 
effect  
(Z-value) 
Coefficient 
(Z-value) 
Marginal 
effect  
(Z-value) 
Coefficient 
(Z-value) 
Marginal 
effect  
(Z-value) 
Monthly term-time expenditure £1000-1199 0.048 0.017 0.159 0.058 0.155 0.056 0.156 0.056 
 (0.22)        (0.22) (0.69) (0.69) (0.67) (0.67) (0.68) (0.68)
Monthly term-time expenditure over £1200 -0.583 -0.175       -0.468 -0.141 -0.441 -0.132 -0.453 -0.136
 (2.17)**        (2.17)** (1.57) (1.57) (1.44) (1.44) (1.51) (1.51)
Non-white      -0.150 -0.224-0.052 -0.075 -0.152 -0.051 -0.214 -0.071
 (1.50)        (1.50) (2.08)** (2.08)** (1.36) (1.36) (1.94)*** (1.94)***
Motivation and attitude variables         
      -0.217 -0.074 -0.244 -0.082 -0.239 -0.080Used the potential amounts of money received to anticipate 
the choice of player 2 ‘every time’   (2.23)** (2.23)** (2.46)** (2.46)** (2.43)** (2.43)** 
      -0.135 -0.047 -0.120 -0.041 -0.137 -0.047Used the potential amounts of money received to anticipate 
the choice of player 2 ‘sometimes’   (1.57) (1.57) (1.37) (1.37) (1.57) (1.57) 
      -0.610 -0.223 -0.596 -0.216 -0.610 -0.222Did not want to have a low payoff ‘every time’ 
        (4.41)* (4.41)* (4.23)* (4.23)* (4.39)* (4.39)*
        0.009 0.003 0.046 0.016 0.012 0.004Did not want to have a low payoff ‘sometimes’ 
        (0.06) (0.06) (0.31) (0.31) (0.08) (0.08)
      -1.001 -0.346 -0.861 -0.297 -0.931 -0.322Wanted to have the highest payoff possible ‘every time’ 
        (8.11)* (8.11)* (6.74)* (6.74)* (7.35)* (7.35)*
      -0.404 -0.135 -0.322 -0.108 -0.366 -0.122Wanted to have the highest payoff possible ‘sometimes’ 
    (3.31)* (3.31)* (2.57)** (2.57)** (2.95)* (2.95)*
    -1.514 -0.523   Attitude index representing attitudes in accordance with 
standard economic theory assumptions     (6.20)* (6.20)*   
        -0.190 -0.065Attitude dummy variable representing attitudes in accordance 
with standard economic theory assumptions       (2.46)** (2.46)** 
Constant -0.374      0.848 1.063 0.848  
 (3.06)*        (4.58)* (5.51)* (4.54)*
Observations         1631 1612 1592 1592
LR Chi-squared         81.50 352.70 393.07 359.36
Pseudo R-squared         0.04 0.17 0.20 0.18
Log likelihood -989.86        -842.40 -807.79 -824.64
Notes: Reference group consists of ‘male’, ‘faculty of arts’, ‘aged under 21’, ‘monthly term-time expenditure £0-199’, ‘white’, and for models [2], [3] and [4] ‘used the 
potential amounts of money received to anticipate the choice of player 2 ‘never’’, ‘did not want to have a low payoff ‘never’’, ‘wanted to have the highest payoff possible 
‘never’’ and for models [3] and [4] ‘have attitudes of weak agreement with statements regarding assumptions of economic theory’. 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses, *** significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1% 
5. Conclusions 
An experiment was conducted to determine the motivations behind decisions in a 
game theory context by asking subjects directly what motivated their decisions in six 
modifications of a Prisoner’s Dilemma game with the strategies ‘share’ or ‘compete’, 
and furthermore determining their overall self-interested beliefs. The results of the 
first Prisoner’s Dilemma game indicates that a significantly higher proportion of 
economics students chose compete. Analysis of the motivations of all subjects for 
their choices in all six games indicates that a higher proportion of economics students 
have motivations in accordance with the assumptions of standard economic theory. 
However, an analysis of general attitudes and values in accordance with the 
assumptions of standard economic theory indicates that economics students do not 
have significantly different attitudes to other subjects regarding the assumptions of 
standard economic theory. Further analysis indicates that motivations and attitudes 
significantly affect the choice to share or compete and these variables are more 
important explanatory variables than purely whether the subject studies economics.  
 
Therefore, it may not be economics students per se that have a lower probability of 
choosing share rather than compete, but instead that individuals with attitudes, 
motivations and values similar to those assumed by standard economic theory have a 
lower probability of choosing share, and the economics department has a higher 
proportion of subjects with these motivations. The analysis of motivations and general 
attitudes and values suggests that the assumptions of standard economic theory are 
appropriate for a subset of individuals, and for many individuals who do not study 
economics. However, many individuals do not act according to the assumptions of 
standard economic theory and this requires greater analysis. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1 Probit models for the choice to share adding motivation and attitude 
variables one by one to personal characteristics 
 
 [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] 
Motivation and attitude variables Coefficient 
(Z-value) 
Coefficient 
(Z-value) 
Coefficient 
(Z-value) 
Coefficient 
(Z-value) 
Coefficient 
(Z-value) 
-0.529     Used the potential amounts of 
money received to anticipate the 
choice of player 2 ‘every time’ 
(5.97)*     
-0.353     Used the potential amounts of 
money received to anticipate the 
choice of player 2 ‘sometimes’ 
(4.49)*     
 -1.041    Did not want to have a low payoff 
‘every time’  (8.41)*    
 -0.101    Did not want to have a low payoff 
‘sometimes’  (0.74)    
  -1.376   Wanted to have the highest payoff 
possible ‘every time’   (12.31)*   
  -0.610   Wanted to have the highest payoff 
possible ‘sometimes’   (5.35)*   
   -2.047  Attitude index representing 
attitudes in accordance with 
standard economic theory 
   (8.92)*  
    -0.435 Attitude dummy variable 
representing attitudes in 
accordance with standard 
economic theory assumptions 
    (6.06)* 
Constant -0.093 0.449 0.514 0.086 -0.247 
 (0.71) (2.65)* (3.32)* (0.64) (1.95)*** 
Observations 1624 1621 1626 1611 1611 
LR Chi-squared 119.52 253.81 291.32 168.81 121.84 
Pseudo R-squared 0.06 0.12 0.14 0.08 0.06 
Log likelihood -966.63 -898.29 -880.79 -931.77 -955.26 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses, *** significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant 
at 1% 
 
Table A2 Pearson’s correlation coefficients for the motivation and attitude variables used in the models estimated in table 3 
 
  Used the potential 
amounts of money 
received to anticipate 
the choice of player 2 
Did not want to have a 
low payoff 
Wanted to have the 
highest payoff possible 
     Response SometimesEvery
time 
 Every
time 
Sometimes Every
time 
Sometimes 
Attitude 
index 
Attitude 
dummy 
variable 
Every time 1.00        -0.54 0.16 -0.10 0.08 -0.01 0.02 0.04Used the potential amounts of money 
received to anticipate the choice of player 2 Sometimes -0.54        1.00 0.03 0.00 0.07 -0.01 0.07 0.04
Every time 0.16        0.03 1.00 -0.80 0.38 -0.18 0.11 0.14Did not want to have a low payoff 
Sometimes -0.10        0.00 -0.80 1.00 -0.31 0.23 -0.06 -0.10
Every time 0.08        0.07 0.38 -0.31 1.00 -0.79 0.21 0.22Wanted to have the highest payoff possible 
Sometimes -0.01        -0.01 -0.18 0.23 -0.79 1.00 -0.10 -0.14
Attitude index 0.02        0.07 0.11 -0.06 0.21 -0.10 1.00 0.69
Attitude dummy variable 0.04        0.04 0.14 -0.10 0.22 -0.14 0.69 1.00
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Notes 
                                                 
1 One point not addressed in the literature is whether some observed differences are due to differences 
across countries or cultures as the different studies use samples from different countries. 
2 The questionnaire is available form the authors on request. 
3 Information that subjects are given prior to the completion of the questionnaire is very important. In 
order to reduce respondent bias the objective of the questionnaire to analyse motivations and attitudes 
in economic decision-making is not stated in the email or introduction to the questionnaire, because if 
subjects are aware of the objective of the questionnaire this may encourage responses from subjects 
interested in the subject and may bias responses through a greater awareness that the questions are 
focussing upon motivations and attitudes. Therefore subjects are informed in the email and introduction 
to the questionnaire that they are being invited to take part in a research project examining the way 
people make decisions in real world transactions.  
4 The University of Sheffield had a student population of 23,399 in February 2006. All responses were 
collected from 18 February 2006 until 23 March 2006. The amount of observations is lower in the 
regressions as subjects are included only if there is no missing data for any of the variables. 
5 The ethical motivations and attitudes are not discussed in this paper and will be discussed elsewhere. 
6 Only the first Prisoner’s Dilemma game is here analysed for brevity but the results are robust across 
all games. Explanation of the other games and their results are available from the correspondence 
author. 
7 In the questionnaire the explanation of each game includes details clearly explaining how much each 
player receives for every combination of choices from the respondent and the other player, player 2.  
The explanation of games 2 to 6 includes details of how the payoffs are changed from the previous 
game in order to firstly clearly indicate the differences between the payoffs in that game and previous 
games, secondly make the instructions as clear as possible and thirdly enable subjects to be able to 
quickly understand the differences in each of the games. The strategy chosen by respondents should not 
be affected by the information regarding what has happened to the payoffs as insufficient details are 
included in this information to be able to make a considered decision using only this information. No 
information is given regarding how the respondent could or should make their decision, hence the 
individual will have to determine their own criteria for making their choice, and even if they are 
already familiar with game theory they must decide whether to act in accordance with the theory. 
8 A probit model with an equivalent dependent variable which equals 1 for cooperate and 0 for defect is 
used in Hu and Liu (2003). Their estimated model uses personal characteristics, promises received and 
payoff levels as regressors.  
9 The attitude index combines the responses to the four attitude questions outlined in table 2. Responses 
for each question are numbered according to the scale that 4 = response in strongest agreement with the 
assumptions of standard economic theory and 0 = response in weakest agreement. For example, 
question 1 asks subjects how much they agree or disagree with the statement ‘I consider how my 
actions affect others’, and the responses are coded according to the scale that 4 = disagree strongly, 3 = 
disagree slightly, 2 = neither agree nor disagree, 1 = agree slightly and 0 = agree strongly. The scale is 
reversed for questions 3 and 4. The responses for all four questions are aggregated to give a total out of 
16 and then the total is divided by 16 to determine the index and hence the index lies between 0 and 1. 
A value of 0 indicates weak agreement with statements regarding assumptions of economic theory, and 
a value of 1 indicates strong agreement. The attitude dummy variable combines the responses to the 
four attitude questions outlined in table 2. Responses are numbered as explained above regarding the 
attitude index. The attitude dummy variable has a value of 1 if the subject has a response of 3 or 4 for 
any of the four attitude questions, otherwise the value is zero. A value of 0 indicates weak agreement 
with statements regarding assumptions of economic theory, and a value of 1 indicates strong 
agreement. The attitude index and dummy variables are alternative measures and hence should not be 
used in the same regression. 
10 It is not here examined whether the sex of player 2 affects responses, for a more comprehensive 
discussion see Rapoport and Chammah (1965) and Ortmann and Tichy (1999). 
11 Faculties are determined by first degree subject. The faculty of arts is the default category as this has 
the largest probability of choosing share out of all faculties. Departments that appear in more than one 
faculty are not included in either faculty and are included using a separate dummy variable. The 
economists dummy variable represents economics students determined by first degree subject only. 
12 Motivation question 2 is not included in the estimated models as it suffers from multicollinearity 
with the other motivation and attitude variables. 
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13 If variables representing motivations regarding inequality aversion are also added to the estimated 
models the dummy variable representing economics students is no longer significant. The effect of 
ethical motivations and attitudes are not discussed in this paper and will be discussed elsewhere. 
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